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We link the reputation incentives of independent directors to the informativeness of stock prices. We show 
that when more independent directors rank a directorship high, the firm-specific information content in a 
firm’s stock price increases. Further, independent directors with high reputation incentives serve firms that 
voluntarily disclose more information and display lower crash risk. We find similar results when using 
plausibly exogenous shocks to the reputation incentives of independent directors. Our results therefore 
support a causal interpretation of the positive influence that independent directors with reputation incentives 
exert on corporate transparency.  
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A key function of financial markets is the production and aggregation of information into market prices. 
Information contained in securities prices guides important decisions by managers, investors and other 
participants in the real economy. However, information asymmetries between managers and outside 
investors prevent investors from pricing firm-specific information accurately. Therefore, understanding 
how firms can facilitate and maintain high levels of corporate transparency is an important issue. 
 Independent directors monitor managers and lower the information advantages that managers have 
over outside investors. Consistent with this, studies show that boards with a greater proportion of 
independent directors increase the quality of financial reporting and improve a firm’s information 
environment (Chen, Cheng and Wang, 2015; Armstrong, Core, and Guay, 2014; Beekes, Pope and Young, 
2004). However, what motivates independent directors to improve corporate transparency is largely 
unknown and is the focus of our study. In this paper, we link the reputation concerns of independent 
directors to firm transparency. We show that the stronger the reputation concerns of independent directors, 
the higher the firm-specific information content in stock prices.  
Our reputation measure is from Masulis and Mobbs (2014) and is based on the size of a firm relative 
to other firms that an independent director also serves. Masulis and Mobbs rank the directorships of 
individual directors by market value and argue firms confer higher reputation benefits to independent 
directors when more independent directors rank a directorship high (defined as the firm’s market 
capitalization being at least 10% larger than their smallest directorship) relative to other independent 
directorships they hold.  
The rationale behind this measure is straightforward. Independent directors have incentives to 
maintain and enhance their reputation as effective monitors (Fama and Jensen, 1983), and large firms offer 
greater opportunities for reputation building (Adams and Ferreira, 2008), higher visibility (Shivdasani, 
1993) and higher compensation (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004). Various previous studies present results 
consistent with the notion that firm size is a proxy for reputation incentives and that independent directors 
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allocate more effort to larger firms (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014; Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Masulis, 2013; 
Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz, 2010; Adams and Ferreira, 2008).1 
We argue that independent directors with strong reputation incentives improve firm transparency. 
This is because independent directors rely on a transparent information environment and accurate firm-
specific information to monitor and advise effectively (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Kaplan and Reishus, 
1990). The need for firm-specific information means that independent directors with reputation incentives 
will be wary of private information volunteered by managers since managers may be hesitant to disclose 
information that could be used to discipline them (Jin and Myers, 2006; Jensen, 1993). When facing higher 
reputation incentives, publicly available information – that is subject to scrutiny by analysts, auditors, 
regulators, and the media (Armstrong, Core and Guay, 2014; Miller, 2006) – will become more important 
to independent directors. Therefore, independent directors will elicit greater corporate transparency as their 
reputation incentives increase.  
We test these propositions using an unbalanced panel of US firms between 1996 and 2012. Our 
findings confirm a positive link between the reputation incentives of independent directors and firm 
transparency. We show that the proportion of independent directors who rank a directorship high relative 
to the other independent directorships they hold is positively associated with stock price informativeness. 
By the same token, the proportion of independent directors for whom the directorship is of relatively low 
rank is negatively associated with stock price informativeness. These effects on price informativeness are 
economically meaningful. For instance, a 10% increase in our directorship rankings measure 
(approximately the same as one additional director on a nine-person board ranking the directorship high) is 
associated with a 3.43% increase in stock price informativeness.  
                                                     
1 Specifically, Adams and Ferreira (2008) find that the likelihood that a director exhibits attendance problems decreases with firm 
size, which suggests that directors care more about attending meetings in larger firms. Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz (2010) suggest 
that CEOs see prestigious boards as those of ‘firms of similar or larger size relative to their own’. Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Masulis 
(2013) argue that directors are more willing to accept non-local board appointments if the firm is large because board seats in larger 
firms offer ‘greater reputation benefits, career building opportunities, and networking benefits’. Masulis and Mobbs (2014) show 
that independent directors with multiple appointments put more effort—in the form of higher attendance and more board committee 
memberships—into the largest firms in their portfolio of directorships. 
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Importantly, our results are not explained by the presence of independent directors. The presence 
of independent directors with high reputation incentives, but not the proportion of independent directors, 
explains variation in stock price informativeness. Our results are robust to alternative measures for 
reputation incentives, alternative measures for stock price informativeness, and additional board 
characteristics (including measures for the expertise, diversity and social ties of board members) that could 
explain the relationship between director appointments and a firm’s information environment. 
Establishing a causal relationship between reputation incentives and stock informativeness is 
challenging. Our results could be driven by firm-level unobservables that correlate with the information 
environment and board characteristics. To address this, we exploit a plausibly exogenous change in our 
reputation incentive variable. Following Masulis and Mobbs (2014), we identify a group of treatment firms 
in which at least one director experiences an increase in her directorship ranking that is due to a decrease 
in the value of other firms in their directorship portfolio. The reduction in firm size is due to reasons that 
are specific to other firms (e.g. poor performance or divestitures) and therefore unrelated to the firm under 
investigation.  
 We match treatment firms with a group of control firms that are in the same industry and are nearest 
to our treatment firms in terms of size.2 We then carry out a difference-in-difference analysis with firm-
level fixed effects. Our empirical set-up captures the average change in price informativeness within 
treatment firms compared to the average change in price informativeness within control firms. This set-up 
alleviates concerns that our results are influenced by unobserved between-firm heterogeneity or by firm 
size (since treatment and control firms are matched on size). We find that, following an increase in the 
directorship ranking that is caused by a decrease in the size of other firms, treatment firms experience an 
increase in the level of price informativeness relative to our matched control firms. This supports a causal 
                                                     
2 Specifically, we use nearest neighbor matching with replacement and require that our treatment and control firms are in the same 
industry (based on two-digit SIC code) and are nearest in market capitalization. Additionally, we stipulate that firms in the control 
group do not employ independent directors who also serve firms in our treatment group. We also exclude firms from our control 
group that experience a substantial (>10%) change in market valuation in the treatment year and firms in which any independent 
director gains or loses a directorship in a given year. 
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interpretation of the effect that changes in the reputation incentives of independent directors have on firm 
transparency.   
 We also rule out that our results are due to a workload effect, where independent directors devote 
more time to larger firms because larger firms are more complex. We exploit shocks to the reputation 
incentives of individual directors that result when mergers cause independent directors to lose one of their 
other directorships. Our results indicate that the termination of other directorships only leads to an 
improvement in price informativeness if the merger causes an improvement in reputation incentives. We 
do not find any effect when mergers lower director workloads without an increase in reputation incentives. 
We interpret this as evidence that reputation incentives and not director workloads explain our results. 
In the final part of our paper, we provide direct evidence on how reputation incentives improve 
transparency. We first show that the more independent directors rank a directorship high, the more 
information firms disclose to investors on a voluntary basis. Following Carter and Soo (1999) and Gul, 
Srinidhi and Ng (2011), we focus on category #8 (‘other events’) of 8-K regulatory filings. We show that 
when independent directors with strong reputation incentives serve firms in weak information environments 
(proxied by fewer stock analysts covering a firm, greater analyst disagreements regarding the future 
performance of a firm, or less arbitrage-based trading), the number of voluntary disclosures made by these 
firms increases. Specifically, for firms operating in a weak information environment, an increase in the 
reputation incentives of one independent director is associated with a 20% increase in the number of 
category #8 filings over the next three years.  
Finally, to highlight the economic implications of director reputation incentives for investors, we 
link corporate transparency to the prospect of large stock price losses. We hypothesize that if information 
asymmetry permits managers to hide and accumulate bad news (Kim et al., 2011; Hutton et al., 2009), a 
growing discrepancy between intrinsic and current share prices is likely (Jin and Myers, 2006). The latter 
should mean a higher risk of substantial wealth losses for shareholders when previously concealed 
information is suddenly priced. Consistent with this expectation, we find that, following an increase in 
reputation incentives at a firm, various measures of crash risk decrease. 
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This paper makes two main contributions to the literature. We are the first to identify the reputation 
incentives of independent directors as a determinant of firm transparency. Our paper therefore adds to the 
literature on corporate transparency (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Lang et al., 2012; Bushman et al., 2004) and 
more specifically to the literature on transparency and corporate governance (Chen et al., 2015; Armstrong 
et al., 2012; Ferreira and Laux, 2007). More broadly, our paper also contributes to the literature that analyzes 
the effects of director networks and their effect on firm outcomes (Renneboog and Zhao, 2014; Larcker, So 
and Wang, 2013; Chiu, Teoh, and Tian, 2012). We add to this literature by providing evidence of the 
incentives of individual directors to exert effort within their networks of directorships. In essence, our 
results identify reputation incentives as one reason for why directors improve transparency.  
Second, our study contributes to work on the information content of stock prices (e.g., Ben-Nasr and 
Cosset, 2014; Kim et al., 2014; Chan and Hameed, 2006; Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2004). These 
studies find that better availability of firm information leads to more informed trading and to more 
informative pricing. However, the determinants of price informativeness that this literature has identified 
range from analyst coverage to disclosure rules and are largely outside the immediate control of firms.3 A 
key contribution of this study is therefore that we identify a determinant of a firm’s price informativeness 
that is not exogenous to the firm and that firms can actively manage by recruiting certain independent 
directors.  
2 Background: reputation incentives and firm-specific information  
Firms structure their board of directors according to their needs for monitoring and advising (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Independent directors may be appointed to satisfy a firm’s needs for expertise (Masulis, 
Wang, and Xie, 2012; DeFond, Hann, and Hu, 2005), diversity in the boardroom (e.g. Adams and 
Ragunathan, 2015), or because of social ties to other board members (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014; 
Hwang and Kim, 2009). Likewise, firms may appoint independent directors for their networks of 
                                                     
3 Specifically, previous studies have examined the effects on price informativeness linked to analyst coverage (Chan and Hameed, 
2006), cross-listings (Fernandez and Ferreira, 2008), disclosure rules (Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2004; Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam, 2011), press freedom (Kim et al., 2014), and government ownership (Ben-Nasr and Cosset, 2014). 
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directorships (Akbas, Meschke, and Wintoki, 2016; Coles et al., 2012) or to suit their own information 
environment (Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo, 2011; Coles et al., 2008). 
 The previous literature has mostly focused on the determinants of board structure from a demand 
perspective. However, board structure is also determined by a director’s willingness to serve a board and 
expend effort (Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz, 2017). Reputation incentives could offer one supply side 
explanation for why some independent directors are more effective in their role. Theoretical work has long 
pointed to the importance of supply side arguments in the director labor market. For instance, Fama (1980) 
argues that a strong reputation increases the value of directors’ human capital and opens up opportunities 
for additional appointments.  
Various studies report evidence in line with the view that reputation incentives are linked to firm 
size. Adams and Ferreira (2008) argue that large firms offer independent directors opportunities to enhance 
their reputation. Consistent with this, Masulis and Mobbs (2014) demonstrate that independent directors 
with multiple appointments show increased board attendance and more board committee memberships at 
the relatively largest firms they serve. Masulis and Mobbs (2016) show that independent directors will act 
more vigorously at the relatively largest firms which is associated with less earnings management, option 
backdating and other negative outcomes that could damage a director’s reputation. 
Reputation concerns also explain why independent directors value public firm information despite 
having privileged access to private information from management (e.g. through access to internal financial 
reports and informal communications with managers). Independent directors are likely to be wary of private 
information volunteered by management. The contents and timing of such information may be opportunistic 
since managers have few incentives to share information that is detrimental to their interests (Jin and Myers, 
2006; Jensen, 1993). By contrast, public information is subject to scrutiny by outside parties such as 
analysts, auditors, regulators and the media (Armstrong, Core and Guay, 2014; Miller, 2006). Public 
information is therefore a trustworthy source of firm-specific information for directors and a useful way of 
validating the accuracy of information that directors have obtained through private channels. 
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 In contrast to the arguments made above, the findings of Fahlenbrach et al. (2017) suggest that 
reputation incentives may not motivate independent directors to monitor more effectively. The authors 
show that independent directors may exit a firm to protect their reputation before bad news are published. 
Therefore, whether reputation incentives boost corporate transparency is an empirical question and the 
question we address in this paper. 
If independent directors with stronger reputation incentives have greater needs for accurate firm-
specific information, we argue that these independent directors will elicit greater corporate transparency. 
We thus expect price informativeness to increase with the proportion of directors who rank a directorship 
high relative to all other directorships they hold. By the same token, independent directors who rank a 
directorship low will not be incentivized to reduce firm information asymmetry. We therefore expect price 
informativeness to decrease with the proportion of directors who rank a directorship low relative to all other 
directorships they hold.  
3 Key variables and data 
3.1 Stock price informativeness 
We employ idiosyncratic volatility as our key proxy for stock price informativeness (Gul et al., 2011; 
Ferreira and Laux, 2007). Developed by Roll (1988), this measure reflects firm-specific stock return 
variation or the variation in the return on a stock that cannot be explained by market returns. 
 Stock price informativeness for a generic firm i in year t is defined as  




2 ). (1) 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2  is estimated from the following single-factor market model, 𝑟𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑑 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑑 where 
𝑟𝑖,𝑑 is the daily return on stock i on day d and 𝑟𝑚,𝑑 is the value-weighted market return on day d.
4 A high 
(low) level of stock price informativeness can be interpreted as stock price having a greater (smaller) level 
                                                     
4 Market returns are derived using the CRSP NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ Value-Weighted Market Index.  
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of firm-specific information content because the market return explains a smaller (greater) component of 
stock volatility. 
3.2 Independent director reputation incentives 
To construct our measures of independent director reputation incentives, we follow Masulis and Mobbs 
(2014) and collect director information from the universe of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) firms 
between 1996-2012. We follow ISS criteria to determine which board members are independent. ISS 
require that independent directors do not have any other material affiliation with the company (apart from 
the board seat). This includes any relation to the company’s current or former executives or any 
professional, financial, or charitable relationship with the company.  
For each independent director, we rank all directorships in her portfolio by firm market 
capitalization.5 We hypothesize that the firms that are more highly ranked are more important for a director 
and, correspondingly, that lower-ranked firms are less important. 
 We then consolidate the director data into firm-level variables. As in Masulis and Mobbs (2014), 
%High (Low) Ranked is the proportion of independent directors for whom the firm’s directorship is at least 
10% larger (smaller) than their smallest (largest) directorship. These variables capture the relative 
importance of the firm’s directorship to the directors within the firm. 
 Figure 1 illustrates how the variables are constructed using Office Depot in 2012 as an example. 
Office Depot’s board has six independent directors, three of which hold multiple appointments (Hedrick, 
Gaines and Mason). Hedrick serves both Office Depot and Hot Topic as an independent director. At $937m, 
the market capitalization of Office Depot is significantly greater than Hot Topic’s $447m capitalization. 
Hedrick therefore ranks the Office Depot directorship high. In contrast, Gaines and Mason rank the Office 
Depot’s low as they each hold another directorship with a significantly larger firm. Out of Office Depot’s 
                                                     
5 Our reputation incentives measure is an in-sample measure that is computed using directorship information from ISS. This is 
unlikely to bias our results. ISS collects data on firms in the S&P 1500 Index. The S&P 1500 covers the largest US firms 
(approximately 90% of the market capitalization of all US firms). Since our reputation incentives measure is constructed based on 
market capitalization, any omitted (out-of-sample) directorships are directorships at small and arguably less prestigious firms, 
which are likely to have little effect on the reputation of independent directors. 
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six independent directors, one director has high reputation incentives and two directors have low reputation 
incentives. Consequently, %High Ranked is 1/6 whilst %Low Ranked is 2/6. 
3.3 Sample 
Our data is an unbalanced panel of 12,813 firm-year observations relating to 1,357 US firms between 1996 
– 2012.6 The data are from the following sources. Director data and data on a firm’s anti-takeover provisions 
are from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS, formerly RiskMetrics), which covers S&P 1500 firms. 
Financial accounting variables are constructed using Compustat. Our stock price informativeness measure 
is calculated using daily stock price information from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Analyst coverage data is obtained from I/B/E/S.  
[Table 1 about here]  
Table 1 reports summary statistics. The average market-model R2 among our sample firms is 0.282, 
suggesting that 71.8% (1-0.282) of an average firm’s return variations cannot be explained by market 
returns. The average Price Informativeness, which is the logistic transformation of market-model R2 is 
1.225. The mean for %High Ranked is 12.6%. This suggests that an average board of nine directors has 
about one independent director who ranks the firm as more important in her portfolio of independent 
directorships. The average for %Low Ranked is slightly higher at 15.5%. The average proportion of 
independent directors is 71.5%. Finally, only 0.5% of our sample firm years have busy boards (where the 
majority of directors hold three or more directorships), while about 60% of sample firm years have a 
majority of directors who only sit on a single board. The distribution of our sample firm characteristics is 
also shown in Table 1 (see Table A1 for variable descriptions). 
                                                     
6 Following prior literature, we exclude financial services (SIC code 4900-4999) and utility firms (SIC code 6000-6999) from the 
sample. 
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4 Baseline Results 
4.1 Independent director reputation incentives and stock price informativeness 
We test the relation between the reputation incentives of independent directors and stock price 
informativeness using the following model: 
𝜓𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1%High Ranked𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2%Low Ranked𝑖𝑡 + CONTROL𝑖𝑡𝚷 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
 Based on prior literature, we include a number of board and firm characteristics in CONTROL𝑖𝑡. 
We include board size because Gul, Srinidhi and Ng (2011) find that stock price informativeness increases 
in board size. We also include board independence. Ferreira, Ferreira and Raposo (2011) find that 
independent directors improve the quality of financial reporting, while Armstrong et al. (2014) find that 
price informativeness decreases with board independence.  
Further, we control for profitability (defined as return on book equity) and profit variability (the 
variance of a firm’s return on equity). Chan and Hameed (2006) argue that firms with more volatile returns 
produce more firm-specific information. We include leverage as more levered firms may exhibit higher 
idiosyncratic volatility due to the higher likelihood that these firms experience distress (Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam, 2011). Following Ferreira and Laux (2007), we also include the Market-to-Book ratio, 
which is defined as the ratio between market and book equity, and a dividend dummy variable which equals 
one for dividend-paying firms and zero otherwise. 
We include firm size as Roll (1988) finds that large firms tend to incorporate more market-wide 
information compared to small firms. Firm size is measured as the logarithm of total market capitalization. 
We also control for size to alleviate concerns that (absolute) firm size rather than relative size rankings by 
directors explain our results. Larger firms are more likely to have more independent directors that will rank 
these firms high relative to the other firms they serve.7  
                                                     
7 Further, we document that size is negatively related to stock price informativeness in our sample. Therefore, any remaining effect 
of size is likely to make the magnitude of our coefficients smaller than reported. 
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We also include firm age (in log form) and a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is 
diversified (defined as operating in more than one industry). The stock volatility of diversified firms will 
more closely resemble market volatility and have a smaller idiosyncratic component (Roll, 1988). We 
therefore expect a negative relation between diversification and stock price informativeness.  
We proxy for liquidity using stock turnover, which is defined as the number of trades divided by 
the number of shares outstanding. Stock liquidity may facilitate informed trading and thus increase stock 
price informativeness (Chordia and Subramanyam, 2008); alternatively, liquidity may boost uninformed 
order flows and thus lower stock price informativeness (Ferreira, Ferreira and Raposo, 2011; Easley, 
Hvidkjaer and O’Hara, 2002). 
We also control for Discretionary Accruals as the absolute value of the residuals from Jones’ (1991) 
accrual model. A high value of Discretionary Accruals indicates low earnings quality, and we anticipate a 
negative relation between this variable and stock price informativeness (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 
2011). 
We control for Analyst Coverage, defined as the number of earning forecasts made by security 
analysts in each financial year, to proxy for information dissemination by security analysts (Fernandes and 
Ferreira, 2008; Chen, Goldstein and Jiang, 2007; Chan and Hameed, 2006). We also control for Bebchuk 
et al.’s (2007) manager entrenchment index (E-Index). Ferreira and Laux (2007) argue that firms with fewer 
takeover provisions (i.e. more entrenched management) have higher stock price informativeness because 
they encourage more informed trading by investors.  
 [Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 reports OLS regression results with industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlations within firm-level clusters. In Column 1, we regress our 
stock price informativeness variable on Busy Board, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
when the majority of directors hold three or more directorships. We find that the coefficient for Busy Board 
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is negative and statistically significant.8 This is consistent with the view that busy boards are detrimental to 
firm transparency.  
In Column 2, we estimate the model from Equation 2, which includes the reputation incentive 
measures. Consistent with our expectations, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between stock price informativeness and the proportion of directors who rank a directorship high. Also 
consistent with our expectations, price informativeness is negatively and significantly related to the 
proportion of directors who rank a directorship low.  
A 10% increase in %High Ranked (approximately the equivalent to one additional director on a 
nine-person board finding the directorship at least 10% larger than the smallest firm she serves) is associated 
with a 3.42% increase in the stock price informativeness. Conversely, a 10% increase in %Low Ranked is 
associated with 2.18% decrease in stock price informativeness. The economic effects of these two key 
variables are larger than any other board variable included in the model. To illustrate this, an increase in 
board size by one director is associated with a mere 0.22% increase in stock price informativeness.  
Column 3 includes both reputation incentive variables and the Busy Board dummy variable. Both 
the Busy Board dummy and reputation incentive measures remain significant determinants of stock price 
informativeness. This suggests that although busy independent directors may have an adverse effect on 
stock price informativeness, this effect can be negated when these busy independent directors see the firm 
as relatively more important. This also confirms that Busy Board and our board-level measures of reputation 
incentives capture different effects that directors have on firm transparency. 
The estimated coefficients for Board Independence are similar across different specifications. This 
suggests that the reputation incentive variables capture different information from the conventional board 
independence proxy. Similar to Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011), we do not find the coefficient for Board 
Independence to be statistically significant nor economically meaningful, yet the coefficients for our 
reputation incentives measures are statistically significant in all specifications. These results confirm that 
                                                     
8 We also find that the measure of stock price informativeness is negatively related with the proportion of busy directors. The results 
are unreported for brevity. 
 13 
the mere presence of independent directors does not affect firm transparency; instead, variation in the 
reputation incentives of independent directors affects transparency. 
In Column 4, we introduce Single Directorship as a control variable that equals one when the 
majority of independent directors only hold one directorship. These directors arguably have the greatest 
reputation incentives, as they wish to protect their only directorship. However, Single Directorship does 
not enter the model significantly. In contrast, both reputation incentive measures (%High Ranked and %Low 
Ranked) remain statistically significant. 
Finally, in Table A2 of the Appendix, we analyze the relation between stock price informativeness 
and reputation incentives when directors serve on one of four board committees: audit, corporate 
governance, compensation and nomination committees. We find the results are stronger when independent 
directors with reputation incentives serve on the audit and compensation committees. Arguably, these two 
committees require relatively more commitment and input from independent directors (Masulis and Mobbs 
2014). Our results are therefore consistent with the view that higher information demands of independent 
directors with reputation incentives motivates them to make more firm-specific information public. 
Overall, our results are complimentary to prior studies that show that the presence of independent 
directors increase corporate transparency (e.g. Chen, Cheng and Wang, 2015; Armstrong, Core, and Guay, 
2014; Beekes, Pope and Young, 2004). However, we extend their findings further by showing that it is the 
presence of independent directors with high reputation incentives that enhance the firm’s information 
environment and increase the level of firm-specific information in stock prices. 
4.2 Alternative measures and alternative model specifications 
In Table 3, we verify that our key finding is not sensitive to changes in our model specification, the 
reputation incentive measures, or the stock price informativeness measures.  
[Table 3 about here]  
Panel A employs alternative measures of reputation incentives. Column 1 uses lagged reputation to 
alleviate simultaneity concerns between reputation measures and price informativeness. The reputation 
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measures in Columns 2 and 3 use total assets and sales as ranking variables, instead of market capitalization. 
In Columns 4 and 5, we alternate the company size threshold from 10% to 5% and 20%. As large/small 
firms may be underrepresented in certain industries, our reputation measures may capture cross-industry 
influences that change over time. To alleviate this concern, we compute our ranking variable using industry-
adjusted size measures in Column 6. That is, we demean each firm’s market capitalization by its yearly 
industry average before computing the reputation ranking variable. We find our results remain similar to 
our baseline results. 
In Panel B, we show that our results hold under different alternative measures for price 
informativeness. Column 7 employs weekly data to compute price informativeness and Column 8 uses the 
residuals from the Fama and French model. To alleviate concerns that idiosyncratic volatility is associated 
with noise rather than firm-specific information (Dasgupta et al., 2010), we proxy for price informativeness 
using the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) in Column 9 and the probability of informed trading of 
Easley and O’Hara (2004) in Column 10. 
Board characteristics are not random variables and independent directors are chosen by firms to suit 
their own information environment and the bargaining power of stakeholders. Panel C of Table 3 tests 
whether the documented relation between reputation incentives and stock price informativeness is 
confounded by other characteristics of independent directors.  
Column 11 controls for #Board Connections, which is defined as the total number of independent 
directors’ other board appointments. This alleviates concerns that our measures, which rely on independent 
directors with multiple board appointments, capture the quality of information transmitted through the 
network of directors (Akbas, Meschke, and Wintoki, 2016). As some CEOs may appoint independent 
directors based on social ties (Hwang and Kim, 2009) and this may inhibit their ability to perform their 
board functions, we include (in Column 12) %Co-opted Independent Directors, which is defined as the 
proportion of independent who are appointed after the CEO assumes office (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 
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2014).9 As female directors and directors with a minority status tend to hold more board seats (e.g. Adams 
and Ragunathan, 2015), in Columns 13 and 14, we include %Female Independent Directors and %Non-
Caucasian Independent Directors in the model. Finally, Columns 15 and 16 control for international 
expertise (Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2012) and financial expertise (DeFond, Hann, and Hu, 2005) of 
independent directors. We find that our findings continue to hold in all results. 
5 Identification: shocks to reputation incentives 
Establishing causality between the reputation incentives of independent directors and stock price 
informativeness is challenging. For instance, it is recognized in the literature that, rather than boards shaping 
the corporate information environment, the information environment may instead determine the make-up 
of the board (e.g. Coles et al., 2008; Armstrong et al., 2014). More generally, our results could be driven 
by unobserved between-firm heterogeneity that could explain why independent directors with high 
reputation incentives match with more transparent firms. For instance, independent directors with multiple 
directorships could opt to serve more transparent firms if more transparency means less monitoring efforts 
for them (see Ferreira, Ferreira and Raposo, 2011).  
5.1 Plausibly exogenous increases in directorship rankings 
To alleviate concerns that our results could be driven by these alternative explanations, we exploit a 
plausibly exogenous shock to the reputation incentives of independent directors. Our empirical set-up is 
similar to Masulis and Mobbs (2014). Specifically, we identify 228 treatment firms that satisfy the 
following criteria. The firm has at least one independent director (a ‘treatment director’) who experiences 
an increase in the ranking of this directorship relative to the other directorships she holds. Crucially, this 
ranking increase is plausibly exogenous because it is caused by a decrease in the market capitalization of 
other firms in her portfolio of directorships. To ensure that this condition is satisfied, we exclude cases 
                                                     
9 Informal social ties between directors could arguably affect the monitoring effort of independent directors. However, social ties 
linked to director education or employment history are difficult to measure and can only be estimated with significant error. Absent 
verifiable data on informal social director networks, we use data on informal ties between the CEO and independent directors based 
on observable appointment data in the form of % Co-opted Independent Directors.  
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where a change in directorship ranking is caused by changes in the valuation of the treatment firm and cases 
where treatment directors gain or lose a directorship during the event year. We also exclude treatment firms 
that experience a size change that is greater than 10% in a single year. 
 We match treatment firms with control firms using nearest neighbor matching method (Abadie, 
Drukker, Herr, and Imbens, 2004). Specifically, control firms are in the same industry as treatment firms 
(as defined by two-digit SIC code) and are nearest in size (based on market capitalization), but do not have 
any treatment director on their boards. Matching based on size is important, because it diminishes concerns 
that our results are driven by size.10 Firms that change more than 10% in size over a single year are also 
excluded from the control group.  
 We then investigate the change in price informativeness due to a plausibly exogenous increase in 
the ranking of a directorship using a difference-in-difference analysis. For each firm, we include three years 
prior to the change in directorship ranking and three years after the change in directorship ranking. 
 The estimation model is as follows: 
 𝜓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(Ranking Increase𝑖,𝑡 × Post Period𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2Ranking Increase𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3Post Period𝑖,𝑡 + CONTROL𝑖𝑡𝚷 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
The variable Ranking Increase𝑖,𝑡 equals one for treatment firms and zero for control firms. The 
variable Post Period𝑖,𝑡 equals one for the three years after the plausibly exogenous shock in director ranking 
and zero for the three years before. CONTROL𝑖𝑡 represents the same set of control variables as Equation 2. 
To alleviate the concern that our results are biased by unobserved between-firm heterogeneity, we include 
firm fixed effects (𝜂𝑖) in our estimation. 
The coefficient of interest is the interaction between Ranking Increase𝑖,𝑡 and Post Period𝑖,𝑡 ( ). If 
monitoring by directors with reputation incentives leads to more firm-specific information in stock prices, 
                                                     
10 The average market capitalization of the treatment group is $11,032m whereas the average market capitalization of the control 
group is $9,556m.  
b1
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we expect a higher level of price informativeness in treatment firms after an exogenous increase in 
reputation incentives.  
[Table 4 about here] 
The difference-in-difference results in Table 4 show that the coefficients on Ranking Increase𝑖,𝑡 ×
Post Period𝑖,𝑡 are positive and significant. In Column 1, the average idiosyncratic volatility of treatment 
firms is 11.2% higher than the control firms after a positive shock to directorship rankings. Interestingly, 
the effects of an increase in reputation incentives on price informativeness under this identification are 
greater than the results presented in Table 2. Although this effect is attributed to an increase of a single 
high-ranked director, this is a large increase because an average board only has one high-ranked director.11 
In Column 2, we introduce board and firm control variables and find that the coefficient remains statistically 
significant (p<0.05) and of similar economic magnitude. Therefore, the results in this section show that an 
exogenous increase in director reputation incentives leads to an increase in firm transparency.  
5.2 Can reputation incentives be explained by workload effects? 
Another potential concern is that the reputation measures capture a workload effect rather than the effect 
of reputation incentives. It is conceivable that, because large firms are more complex and require more 
monitoring efforts than small firms, independent directors devote a greater proportion of their time to large 
firms. 
To disentangle reputation incentive effects from possible workload effects, we exploit shocks to 
the reputation incentives of individual directors that result when mergers cause the termination of entire 
boards and independent directors lose one of their other directorships (Hauser, 2013). The rationale for this 
test is as follows. While the loss of any directorship will result in a workload reduction, only the loss of a 
directorship at a large firm will increase reputation incentives due to the increase in the relative size of the 
remaining firms. 
                                                     
11 The mean for %High Ranked is 0.126, which approximately equal to one high-ranked independent director on a board of nine 
directors. 
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To this end, we implement a difference-in-difference estimation and identify treatment firms that 
satisfy the following criteria. First, treatment firms must have at least one independent director who loses 
one of her other directorships due to an M&A transaction (treatment directors). Second, we manually verify 
that each merger leads to the termination of the entire board12 and that the affected directors do not gain 
additional directorships in the subsequent year. Using these criteria, we obtain 108 treatment firms. Control 
firms are those without any treatment directors nor have they participated in any merger event. 
The empirical set up is the same as in our previous analysis in Table 4. We require that treatment 
and control firms are in the same industry and match them by market capitalization using nearest neighbor 
matching with replacement (Abadie, et al., 2004). 
Table 5 reports the results using a difference-in-difference estimation with firm fixed effects. We 
find that the interaction between Other Directorship Terminatedi,t, which equals one for our treatment firms 
and zero otherwise, and Post Periodi,t, which equals one in the three years after the M&A event and zero in 
the three years before, are positive and significant. We find that the loss of other directorships is associated 
with 10.7% increase in stock price informativeness in subsequent years. 
We further support our interpretation that the increase in price informativeness is due to reputation 
incentives by analyzing two subsamples of treatment firms: (i) firms where independent directors lose their 
largest directorship; and (ii) firms where independent directors lose their smallest directorships. We find 
that price informativeness only increases when directors lose their largest directorship. These cases are 
associated with a 26.7% increase in price informativeness (Column 2 of Table 5). In contrast, we do not 
find evidence that losing directorships in small firms is associated with a change in stock price 
informativeness (Column 3 of Table 5). More importantly, the coefficient for the interaction variable is 
very close to zero (0.012). Jointly, our results suggest that the increase in stock price informativeness is due 
to an increase in reputation incentives rather than a decrease in the workload for independent directors. 
                                                     
12 Typically, this means that the target firm disappears from the ISS Riskmetrics database or that the whole board is replaced by 
new directors. We exclude cases where some independent directors remain on the board as these choices of remaining directors 
may be based on their ability. 
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6 Other implications of stronger reputation incentives: voluntary disclosures and crash risk  
6.1 Director reputation incentives and voluntary firm disclosures 
In this section, we explore voluntary disclosures as a mechanism through which firm independent directors 
are related to stock price informativeness. Following prior literature (e.g. Gul et al., 2011; Carter and Soo, 
1999), we examine Form 8-K filings as a means by which companies voluntarily disclose additional 
information to investors. If independent directors with stronger reputation incentives were to improve a 
firm’s information environment by increasing the amount of firm-specific information available to the 
public, we expect to find a positive link between the reputation incentives of independent directors and how 
frequently firms disclose information on a voluntary basis. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires public firms to file Form 8-K to disclose 
certain material events on an ongoing basis. Events that trigger the filing of 8-Ks can be grouped into nine 
categories (see Table A3). We focus on category #8 (‘other events’) and use this category as our proxy for 
voluntary disclosure.13 Specifically, we define Voluntary Disclosureit as the natural logarithm of one plus 
the number of category #8 events in 8-Ks of firm i in fiscal year t.  
In order to evaluate the effect of a plausible exogenous shock to reputation incentives on the level 
of voluntary disclosures, we conduct difference-in-difference estimation with firm fixed effects using 
Voluntary Disclosureit as the outcome variable. The empirical set-up follows Section 5.1. In addition to the 
previously included control variables, we follow Gul et al. (2011) and control for Other Disclosureit (which 
is defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of events in other categories on a firm’s 8-K 
forms). This controls for the possibility that a firm may file category #8 items to supplement their other 
disclosure items.  
[Table 6 about here]  
                                                     
13 Unlike the other categories in 8-K filings, category #8 allows the firm ‘to report events that are not specifically called for by 
Form 8-K, that the registrant considers to be of importance to security holders’. In the absence of an unambiguous definition of 
what constitutes materiality, managers and directors may exercise substantial discretion with regards to disclosure under this 
category. 
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 Table 6 reports the results. In Column 1, we do not find an increase in category #8 filings in 8-K 
reports following an exogenous increase in directorship ranking (the coefficient for Ranking Increase𝑖,𝑡 ×
Post Period𝑖,𝑡 is not statistically significant). However, independent directors will be particularly reliant 
on transparency when firms operate in a weak information environment (see Armstrong et al., 2014; Jin 
and Myers, 2006). Thus, independent directors may only need to improve transparency and manage their 
reputation risk in a weak information environment.  
To test this conjecture, we estimate extended difference-in-difference models where we interact the 
impact that independent directors with reputation incentives have on transparency with three indicators for 
weak information environments: Low Analyst Coverage14, High Analyst Disagreements15, and High 
Entrenchment (E-Index)16. The results in Columns 2-4 of Table 6 support our conjecture. For instance, we 
find that when a treated firm’s level of analyst coverage is below the industry median, the number of 
voluntary disclosures increases by 18.9% in the period that follows an increase in the directorship ranking 
(Column 2).  
We also find similar results for firms in which EPS forecast dispersion is above the industry median 
(Column 3) and for firms with a high E-Index (Column 4). These results are particularly noteworthy because 
they are consistent with the view that independent directors act in self-interest when improving firm 
transparency. For instance, the fact that independent directors improve transparency in environments with 
fewer arbitrage investors suggests they do so to manage their higher reputation risk in weak information 
                                                     
14 Low Analyst Coverage equals 1 when the number of EPS forecasts made by equity analysts for the firm is below the industry 
median (based on 2-digit SIC codes) and zero otherwise. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) link analyst coverage to increased firm-
specific information in stock prices. 
15 High Analyst Disagreement is a dummy variable which equal one if the standard deviation of EPS forecasts scaled by the mean 
EPS forecast is above the industry-median, and zero otherwise. 
16 To proxy for arbitrage-motivated investing, we follow Ferreira and Laux (2007) and Armstrong, Balakrishnan and Cohen (2012) 
and use the Bebchuk et al., (2009) Entrenchment index. Arbitrage-oriented investors have higher incentives to collect private firm 
information when operating under a less entrenched and more shareholder-friendly regime. Directors with reputation incentives 
should thus be more incentivised when the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index is high (i.e. fewer minority shareholder rights 
and hostile takeovers). High E-Index is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the E-Index is above the industry median, and zero 
otherwise. 
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environments rather than to meet investor demands for more transparency. After all, investor demands for 
more transparency should be low when firms are entrenched and the scope for informed trading is low. 
Overall, the results indicate that a plausibly exogenous increase in the reputation incentives of 
independent directors is associated with more voluntary 8-K disclosures in firms that operate in weaker 
information environments. This evidence is consistent with the view that independent directors with 
reputation incentives use voluntary disclosures as a way to release firm specific information into the market.  
6.2 Director reputation incentives and firm crash risk 
In this final section, we test the association between reputation incentives and an outcome linked to a lack 
of corporate transparency in the form of large stock price losses (Kim et al., 2011; Hutton et al., 2009). We 
refer to the latter as crash risk.  
Information asymmetry increases future crash risk by allowing managers to hide and accumulate bad 
news (Kim et al., 2011; Hutton et al., 2009). Managers may hide bad news from investors for a variety of 
reasons such as career or compensation concerns (Ball, 2009; Kothari et al., 2009). As the amount of bad 
news that remains hidden accumulates, there will be a growing discrepancy between intrinsic and current 
share prices (Jin and Myers, 2006). When a sudden release of the hidden news occurs, the result will be a 
large firm-specific shock and long tails in the distribution of stock returns. We therefore expect to find a 
negative association between independent director reputation incentives and crash risk.  
Consistent with prior studies, we calculate firm-specific daily returns17 and use them to construct 
three measures of firm-specific stock price crash risk. The first measure, COUNT, is the number of crashes 
(extreme downside returns) and jumps (extreme upside returns) for each firm in each fiscal year (Jin and 
Myers, 2006).18 The second measure is NCSKEW, defined as the coefficient of skewness of firm specific 
daily returns multiplied by minus one (Kim et al. 2011). The third measure, DUVOL, is the natural log ratio 
                                                     
17 Defined as the natural log of one plus the residual return from the expanded market model regression i.e 𝑅𝑖,𝑑 = ln (1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑑) 
where 𝜀𝑖,𝑑 is the estimated residual. 
18 Crash and jump incidents are defined as a 3.2 standard deviation return above and below the mean daily returns over each fiscal 
year (corresponding to a 0.1% probability event under the normal distribution). 
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of firm-specific return volatility in a “down” sample to volatility in an “up” sample (Chen, Hong, and Stein, 
2001).19 An increase in these three variables indicates that the firm’s stock price is more prone to crashes. 
Similar to our analysis in Section 6, we employ difference-in-difference estimations with firm fixed 
effects to analyze the relation between a plausibly exogenous increase in reputation incentives and stock 
price crash risk. The control variables include busy directors and directors without other directorships. 
Additionally, we include other variables that have been found to affect stock price crashes. These include 
annual stock returns and the standard deviation of daily returns (Chen, Hong and Stein, 2001). To control 
for persistence in stock return skewness, we introduce the lag value of the negative coefficient of skewness 
into all our models. We also control for discretionary accruals, firm size, the market-to-book ratio, leverage 
and return on equity. 
[Table 7 about here]  
The results are presented in Table 7. The sample period comprises three years before and three 
years after a shock to a directorship ranking. We find that crash risk decreases in the post shock period for 
treatment firms. The coefficients on Ranking Increase𝑖,𝑡 × Post Period𝑖,𝑡 are negative and significant for 
all crash risk measures. Therefore, the evidence is consistent with our expectation that the presence of 
directors with high reputation incentives is negatively associated with firms experiencing crash incidents in 
a financial year (Column 1). Also, the results show that the returns of the firms in which directors have high 
reputation incentives are less negatively skewed (Column 2) and their negative returns are less volatile 
(Column 3).  
7 Conclusions  
Understanding how firms can facilitate and maintain high levels of corporate transparency is an important 
issue. In this paper, we find that the proportion of independent directors who rank their directorship high is 
positively associated with more firm-specific information content in stock prices. We argue that directors 
                                                     
19 For each firm-year, firm specifc daily returns are divided into “down” and “up” samples, where the “down” (“up”) sample 
comprises firm specific daily returns that are below (above) the annual mean. 
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who wish to preserve their reputation in the director labor market will improve the information environment 
of the firm by encouraging managers to release more firm-specific information. Our findings are robust to 
alternative proxies for firm-specific information content and to treatment for endogeneity. Finally, we 
document some evidence that director reputation incentives are linked to lower incidents of firm-specific 
stock price crash. 
Our findings show that the reputation concerns of individual directors can influence the firm-level 
information environment. This has several important implications, not least that a component of a firm’s 
information environment is not exogenous to firms but can be actively shaped by a firm through recruitment 
of independent directors with reputation incentives. Our findings also shine some light on the discussion of 
whether independent directors should hold multiple appointments at the same time. While some research 
views the effectiveness of these directors critically, our results show evidence that multiple directorships 
can have beneficial effects for stockholders in relatively large firms. We show that shareholders should 
benefit from greater price informativeness and lower crash risk provided appointments of independent 
directors are made by firms that are among the largest firms that directors serve.  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
The full sample comprises 12,984 observations from 1,366 S&P 1500 firms from 1996-2012. Market-model R-Squared and Stock 
Price Informativeness are computed using daily stock price data from the Center of Research and Security Prices. 
NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ value-weighted market index (inclusive of dividends) is the proxy for stock market portfolio. Director 
data and corporate governance index are obtained from the Institutional Shareholder Services database. Firm characteristics are 
from Compustat. Analyst coverage data is from I/B/E/S. Variable definitions are provided in Table A1. 
 
Variable N Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75 
Market-Model R-Squared  12,813  0.282 0.176 0.145 0.261 0.401 
Stock Price Informativeness  12,813  1.225 1.281 0.399 1.042 1.773 
%High Ranked  12,813  0.126 0.161 0.000 0.091 0.200 
%Low Ranked  12,813  0.155 0.153 0.000 0.125 0.250 
Busy Board  12,813  0.005 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Single Directorship  12,813  0.620 0.485 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Board Size  12,813  9.151 2.334 7.000 9.000 11.000 
Board Independence  12,813  0.715 0.160 0.625 0.750 0.846 
Profitability  12,813  0.071 7.214 0.058 0.125 0.192 
S.D.(Profitability)  12,813  0.324 7.154 0.020 0.044 0.096 
Leverage  12,813  0.182 0.165 0.025 0.164 0.281 
Market-to-Book  12,813  3.143 3.156 1.541 2.339 3.710 
Firm Size  12,813  7.675 1.572 6.564 7.507 8.638 
Dividend  12,813  0.556 0.497 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Stock Turnover  12,813  2.113 1.801 0.973 1.642 2.682 
Firm Age  12,813  3.164 0.646 2.708 3.178 3.761 
Diversification  12,813  0.642 0.479 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Discretionary Accruals  12,813  0.115 0.157 0.032 0.072 0.136 
Analyst Coverage  12,813  9.334 8.276 3.000 8.000 14.000 





Table 2: Price informativeness on reputation incentive measures 
The dependent variable is Stock Price Informativeness, the logistic transformation of 1-R2 from a market model regression. %High 
Ranked (%Low Ranked) is the proportion of independent directors for whom this directorship is at least 10% larger (smaller) than 
their smallest (largest) directorship. Other control variables are defined in Table A1. In brackets are cluster-robust standard errors. 
Industry and fiscal year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Intercept included but not reported for brevity. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 Dependent Variable =  Stock Price Informativeness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
%High Ranked  0.343*** 0.359*** 0.289**  
  (0.108) (0.109) (0.121)    
%Low Ranked  -0.225*** -0.206** -0.281*** 
  (0.086) (0.086) (0.100)    
Busy Board -0.385***  -0.381*** -0.375*** 
 (0.099)  (0.099) (0.100)    
Single Directorship    -0.039    
    (0.033)    
Board Size 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    
Board Independence 0.083 0.084 0.073 0.104    
 (0.100) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108)    
Profitability 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001    
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
S.D.(Profitability) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000    
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Leverage 0.233*** 0.241*** 0.242*** 0.242*** 
 (0.081) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)    
Market-to-Book 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002    
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
Firm Size -0.248*** -0.277*** -0.276*** -0.276*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)    
Dividend -0.048 -0.043 -0.044 -0.044    
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)    
Stock Turnover -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010    
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)    
Firm Age -0.043* -0.047* -0.046* -0.046*   
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)    
Diversification -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.100*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)    
Discretionary Accruals -0.114 -0.119 -0.118 -0.118    
 (0.081) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)    
Analyst Coverage 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
E-Index -0.024** -0.023* -0.023* -0.023*   
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)    
Observations 12,813 12,813 12,813 12,813 




Table 3: Alternative measures and model specifications 
Panel A presents the results using alternative measures for independent director reputation incentives. In Column 1, reputation measures 
enter the model as lagged variables. In Column 2 and 3, director reputation incentives are ranked by assets and sales respectively. In 
Column 4, % High (Low) Ranked is the proportion of independent directors for whom the firm’s directorship is at least 5% larger (smaller) 
than their smallest (largest) directorship. In Column 5, %High Ranked and %Low Ranked are constructed using a 20% threshold. Column 
6 uses demeaned market capitalization (by industry year) as a ranking variable. Panel B employs alternative measures for stock price 
informativeness. In Column 7, weekly returns are used instead of daily returns. In Column 8, the residuals from the Fama and French three-
factor model are used instead of market model residuals. Column 9 employs Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure as the measure for stock 
price informativeness and Column 10 employs the PIN measure from Easley and O’Hara (2004). Panel C controls for additional board 
characteristics: # of independent directors’ other board appointments, the % of independent directors who are appointed after the CEO 
assumes office, % of female independent directors, % of non-Caucasian independent directors, % of non-US independent directors, and % 
of independent directors with financial expertise. Other control variables are the same as Column 4 in Table 2. Cluster-robust standard 
errors are in brackets. Industry and fiscal year fixed effects are included in all specifications. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
%High Ranked 0.234** 0.241** 0.181* 0.201* 0.219**  0.382*** 
 (0.102) (0.114) (0.104) (0.103) (0.104)    (0.097) 
%Low Ranked -0.116 -0.125 -0.224** -0.283*** -0.284*** -0.313*** 
 (0.080) (0.094) (0.095) (0.091) (0.090)    (0.090) 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,137 12,813 12,813 12,813 12,813 12,813 
R-squared 0.562 0.565 0.565 0.565 0.565    0.567 
 









(Easley & O’Hara, 2004) 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) 
%High Ranked 0.196** 0.184** 0.019*** 0.009**  
 (0.089) (0.091) (0.004) (0.004)    
%Low Ranked -0.143** -0.206*** -0.007** -0.014*** 
 (0.071) (0.076) (0.003) (0.004)    
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,813 12,813 7,509 10,377    
R-squared 0.392 0.570 0.177 0.683    
 
Panel C: Additional board variables 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
%High Ranked 0.286** 0.339*** 0.439*** 0.419*** 0.431*** 0.315*** 
 (0.132) (0.118) (0.123) (0.122) (0.123) (0.120)    
%Low Ranked -0.275** -0.219** -0.217** -0.230** -0.204** -0.391*** 
 (0.125) (0.092) (0.099) (0.099) (0.098) (0.100)    
# Board Connections 0.005      
 (0.007)      
%Co-opted Independent Directors  -0.073**     
  (0.033)     
%Female Independent Directors   0.375**    
   (0.155)    
%Non-Caucasian Independent Directors    0.637***   
    (0.161)   
%Foreign Independent Directors     -0.319  
     (0.257)  
%Independent Directors with Financial Expertise      -0.146    
      (0.091)    
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,813 11,712 11,290 11,290 11,290 4,660    
R-Squared 0.566 0.562 0.561 0.562 0.561 0.485    
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Table 4: Exogenous increase in directorship ranking  
(difference-in-difference with firm fixed effects) 
Treatment firms (indicated by the dummy variable Ranking Increase) are firms that have at least one treatment director. Treatment 
directors are independent directors with multiple directorships, at least one of their other directorships is in a firm that decreases in 
size, and the decrease in size of this other firm leads to an increase in directorship ranking in the current firm. Control firms are 
firms without any treatment director. Control and treatment firms are in the same industry and are matched by market capitalization 
using nearest neighbor matching with replacement. The dummy variable Post Period equals zero (one) in the three years before 
(after) the change in directorship ranking. Firm and fiscal year fixed effects are included in all specifications. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
Dependent Variable = Stock Price Informativeness (1) (2) 
Ranking Increase  Post Period 0.112** 0.094**  
 (0.048) (0.048) 
Ranking Increase -0.038 -0.026    
 (0.063) (0.063)    
Post Period -0.061* -0.074**  
 (0.036) (0.037)    
Busy Board  -0.352    
  (0.482)    
Single Directorship  -0.008    
  (0.043)    
Board Size  -0.007    
  (0.013)    
Board Independence  -0.493**  
  (0.193)    
Profitability  0.042    
  (0.244)    
S.D.(Profitability)  -0.003    
  (0.012)    
Leverage  0.261    
  (0.193)    
Market-to-Book  -0.073*** 
  (0.019)    
Firm Size  -0.171*** 
  (0.048)    
Dividend  0.098*   
  (0.056)    
Stock Turnover  0.061**  
  (0.028)    
Firm Age  0.725*** 
  (0.184)    
Diversification  -0.180**  
  (0.074)    
Discretionary Accruals  -0.126    
  (0.230)    
Analyst Coverage  0.009*   
  (0.005)    
E-Index  -0.010    
  (0.020)    
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 3,646 3,646 




Table 5: Termination of other directorships  
(difference-in-difference with firm fixed effects) 
Treatment firms (indicated by the dummy variable Other Directorship Terminated) are firms that have at least one treatment 
director. Treatment directors in Column 1 are independent directors with multiple directorships who experience the loss of one of 
their other directorships because that firm is an acquisition target. Treatment directors in Column 2 (Column 3) are independent 
directors whose terminated directorship is the largest (smallest) firm in her portfolio of directorships. Control firms are firms with 
no treatment director. Control and treatment firms are in the same industry and are matched by market capitalization using nearest 
neighbor matching with replacement. The dummy variable Post Period equals zero (one) in the three years before (after) the M&A 
event. Firm and fiscal year fixed effects are included in all specifications. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. 










Other Directorship Terminated  Post Period 0.107* 0.267** 0.012    
 (0.062) (0.134) (0.086)    
Other Directorship Terminated -0.170 0.502 -0.069    
 (0.130) (0.783) (0.248)    
Post Period -0.168** -0.426** -0.074    
 (0.070) (0.213) (0.098)    
Busy Board 0.184 -0.320   
 (0.418) (0.483)     
Single Directorship -0.092 0.021 -0.118    
 (0.060) (0.098) (0.077)    
Board Size -0.045** -0.127*** -0.035    
 (0.023) (0.046) (0.031)    
Board Independence 0.449 0.798 -0.188    
 (0.280) (0.496) (0.387)    
Profitability 0.002 -0.036** -0.014    
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.026)    
S.D.(Profitability) 0.005 0.028 0.036    
 (0.012) (0.022) (0.034)    
Leverage -0.533** -0.607 -0.669**  
 (0.210) (0.502) (0.294)    
Market-to-Book 0.000 -0.005* -0.005    
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.007)    
Firm Size -0.005 -0.039 0.060    
 (0.054) (0.118) (0.076)    
Dividend -0.079 -0.055 -0.241*   
 (0.092) (0.176) (0.134)    
Stock Turnover 0.176*** 0.194*** 0.065**  
 (0.032) (0.067) (0.027)    
Firm Age 0.390 1.015 1.127**  
 (0.346) (1.004) (0.509)    
Diversification 0.196* 0.183 0.283    
 (0.101) (0.151) (0.178)    
Discretionary Accruals 0.210 0.661 0.202    
 (0.235) (0.535) (0.280)    
Analyst Coverage 0.007 0.023 0.002    
 (0.005) (0.019) (0.006)    
E-Index 0.044* -0.008 0.059**  
 (0.023) (0.058) (0.030)    
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,314 234 774 
R-squared 0.725 0.816 0.718 
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Table 6: Voluntary disclosures  
(difference-in-difference with firm fixed effects) 
The dependent variable is a logarithm of one plus the number of voluntary disclosures (Item 8) in the firm’s 8-K reports which each fiscal year. Treatment firms (indicated by the 
dummy variable Ranking Increase) are firms that have at least one treatment director. Treatment directors are independent directors who have multiple directorships; at least one of 
their other directorships is in a firm that decreases in size; and, the decrease in size of this other firm leads to an increase in directorship ranking in the current firm. Control firms are 
firms without any treatment director. Control and treatment firms are in the same industry and are matched by market capitalization using nearest neighbor matching with replacement. 
The dummy variable Post Period equals zero (one) in the three years before (after) the change in directorship ranking. Low Analyst Coverage is a dummy variable which equals 1 if 
the number of EPS forecasts made by equity analysts for the firm is below the industry median. High E-Index is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the E-Index is above the industry 
median. High Analyst Disagreement is a dummy variable which equal one if the standard deviation of EPS forecasts scaled by the mean EPS forecast is above the industry-median. 
The variable Other Disclosures is the logarithm of one plus the number of other disclosure items in 8-K reports. Firm and fiscal year fixed effects are included in all specifications. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable = Voluntary Disclosures (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ranking Increase  Post Period  Low Analyst Coverage  0.189**   
  (0.089)   
Ranking Increase  Post Period  High Analyst Disagreement   0.150*  
   (0.090)  
Ranking Increase  Post Period  High E-Index    0.195**  
    (0.099)    
Ranking Increase  Post Period 0.069 -0.009 -0.001 -0.076    
 (0.042) (0.057) (0.059) (0.084)    
Ranking Increase  Low Analyst Coverage  -0.039   
  (0.076)   
Post Period  Low Analyst Coverage  -0.099   
  (0.065)   
Low Analyst Coverage  0.087   
  (0.057)   
Ranking Increase  High Analyst Disagreement   -0.104  
   (0.069)  
Post Period  High Analyst Disagreement   0.054  
   (0.065)  
High Analyst Disagreement   0.024  
   (0.051)  
Ranking Increase  High E-Index    -0.064    
    (0.084)    
Post Period  High E-Index    -0.149**  
    (0.073)    
High E-Index    0.025    
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    (0.070)    
Ranking Increase 0.522*** 0.525*** 0.520*** 0.521*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)    
Post Period  0.189**   
  (0.089)   
Other Disclosures   0.150*  
   (0.090)  
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,496 2,496 2,496 2,496 





Table 7 Crash Risk (difference-in-difference with firm fixed effects) 
The dependent variables are COUNT (the number of stock price crashes minus the number of jumps), NCSKEW (negative 
coefficient of skewness) and DUVOL (the log ratio of volatility in the down sample to volatility in the up sample). Treatment firms 
(indicated by the dummy variable Ranking Increase) are firms that have at least one treatment director. Treatment directors are 
independent directors who have multiple directorships; at least one of their other directorships is in a firm that decreases in size; 
and, the decrease in size of tis other firm leads to an increase in directorship ranking in the current firm. Control firms are firms 
without any treatment director. Control and treatment firms are in the same industry and are matched by market capitalization using 
nearest neighbor matching with replacement. The dummy variable Post Period equals zero (one) in the three years before (after) 
the change in directorship ranking. Firm and fiscal year fixed effects are included in all specifications. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable =  COUNT NCSKEW DUVOL 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ranking Increase  Post Period -0.266*** -0.290*** -0.074*** 
 (0.094) (0.098) (0.022)    
Ranking Increase 0.159* 0.120 0.034    
 (0.095) (0.145) (0.033)    
Post Period 0.047 0.059 0.008    
 (0.076) (0.079) (0.017)    
Busy Board 0.476 0.245 0.080    
 (0.299) (0.365) (0.103)    
Single Directorship -0.008 0.080 0.002    
 (0.087) (0.102) (0.021)    
Board Size -0.007 -0.030 -0.004    
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.005)    
Board Independence -0.167 -0.611 -0.087    
 (0.351) (0.376) (0.079)    
Stock Turnover 0.012 0.038 0.013    
 (0.051) (0.038) (0.008)    
NCSKEW (Lag) -0.067*** -0.142*** -0.028*** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.005)    
Stock Return Volatility 5.703 42.140*** 7.658*** 
 (7.929) (7.393) (1.515)    
Stock Return 1.227 3.870*** 0.707*** 
 (1.176) (0.881) (0.189)    
Firm Size -0.101 -0.200** -0.044**  
 (0.096) (0.087) (0.019)    
Market to Book -0.037*** -0.059*** -0.012*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.004)    
Leverage -0.207 -0.329 -0.076    
 (0.430) (0.504) (0.107)    
Profitability 0.002 -0.007 -0.000    
 (0.027) (0.020) (0.004)    
Discretionary Accruals -0.395 -0.247 -0.129    
 (0.335) (0.386) (0.087)    
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,116 4,116 4,116 




Table A1 Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
  
Price Informativeness Annual logistic transformed idiosyncratic volatility estimated from the market 
model. 
%High Ranked Proportion of directors who are independent, as classified by the Institutional 
Shareholder Services, and for whom this directorship is at least 10% larger than 
their smallest directorship. 
%Low Ranked Proportion of directors who are independent, as classified by the Institutional 
Shareholder Services, and for whom this directorship is at least 10% smaller than 
their largest directorship. 
Busy Board Indicator variable that equals one if the majority of the board is populated by 
directors who hold three or more additional directorship and zero otherwise. 
Single Directorship Indicator variable that equals one if the majority of the board is populated by 
directors whose directorship is their only directorship and zero otherwise. 
Board Size Number of directors on board. 
Board Independence Number of directors classified as independent scaled by total number of directors. 
Independent directors are classified by the Institutional Shareholder Services. To 
be classified as an independent director by ISS, the director must have no material 
connection to the company other than a board seat. Material connections include 
having been and being related to a former executive (including the CEO and the 
founder), having any transactional, professional, financial, and charitable 
relationship of over $10,000 per year with the company, or being attested by the 
board as not being independent. 
Profitability Net income scaled by total value of common equity. 
S.D.(Profitability) Standard deviation of the firm’s profitability in the current year and the previous 
two years. 
Leverage Total long-term debt divided by total assets.  
Market-to-Book Product of number of common shares outstanding and share price at the end of 
fiscal year divided by total common equity. 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of firm market capitalization. 
Dividend Indicator variable which equals one if the firm pays dividends and zero otherwise. 
Firm Age Natural logarithm of one plus firm age measured as the number of years since the 
firm’s inclusion in the Compustat database. 
Diversification Indicator variable that equals one if the firm operates in more than one business 
segment and zero otherwise. 
Stock Turnover Number of trades divided by number of shares outstanding. 
Discretionary Accruals Absolute value of the residual from the Jones (1991) accrual prediction model. 
Analyst Coverage The number of forecasts made by analysts in each financial year. 
E-Index This index is based on six corporate governance provisions, four of which 
potentially prevent minor shareholders from ‘having their way’ (i.e. staggered 
boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for 
mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments), while two of 
which can curb the possibility of a hostile takeover (i.e. poison pills and golden 




Table A2 Reputation incentives in board committees 
This table presents coefficient estimates and cluster-robust standard errors from multivariate OLS regression analysis 
of stock price informativeness on independent director reputation incentives. The dependent variable is Price 
Informativeness, the logistic transformation of 1 − 𝑅2 from market model regression. Committee Membership – 
%High Ranked (%Low Ranked) is the number of committee members who are independent and for whom this 
directorship is at least 10% larger (smaller) than their smallest (largest) directorship scaled by the total number of 
committee members. Other control variables are defined in Table A1. Industry and fiscal year dummy variables are 











Dependent Variable = Price Informativeness (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Committee Membership – %High Ranked  0.175*** 0.102 0.161*** 0.017 
 (0.052) (0.065) (0.053) (0.054) 
Committee Membership – %Low Ranked -0.056 -0.146*** -0.049 -0.045 
 (0.044) (0.046) (0.042) (0.044) 
Board Size 0.021*** 0.003 0.022*** 0.017** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Board Independence 0.032 0.121 0.048 0.083 
 (0.094) (0.114) (0.096) (0.098) 
Profitability 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.012* 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) 
S.D.(Profitability) 0.001 0.006 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage 0.161** -0.178** 0.147* 0.006 
 (0.082) (0.074) (0.082) (0.079) 
Market-to-Book -0.003 0.009** -0.001 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Firm Size -0.255*** -0.147*** -0.253*** -0.203*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Dividend -0.046 -0.173*** -0.050* -0.091*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) 
Stock Turnover -0.007 0.047*** -0.006 0.010 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Firm Age -0.054** -0.128*** -0.055** -0.063** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) 
Diversification -0.098*** -0.096*** -0.097*** -0.116*** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
Discretionary Accruals -0.082 0.044 -0.097 -0.082 
 (0.089) (0.083) (0.088) (0.092) 
Analyst Coverage 0.011*** 0.004* 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
E-Index -0.018 -0.003 -0.017 -0.024** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 11,040 4,727 10,923 9,598 
R-squared 0.577 0.490 0.576 0.567 
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Table A3: Disclosure Item in Form 8-K 
Section 1: Registrant’s Business and Operations  
Item 1.01 Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement 
Item 1.02 Termination of a Material Definitive Agreement 
Item 1.03 Bankruptcy or Receivership 
Item 1.04 Mine Safety - Reporting of Shutdowns and Patterns of Violations 
Section 2: Financial Information 
Item 2.01 Completion of Acquisition or Disposition of Assets 
Item 2.02 Results of Operations and Financial Condition  
Item 2.03 Creation of a Direct Financial Obligation or an Obligation under an Off-Balance Sheet 
Arrangement of a Registrant 
Item 2.04 Triggering Events That Accelerate or Increase a Direct Financial Obligation or an 
Obligation under an Off-Balance Sheet Arrangement 
Item 2.05 Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal Activities 
Item 2.06 Material Impairments 
Section 3: Securities and Trading Markets 
Item 3.01 Notice of Delisting or Failure to Satisfy a Continued Listing Rule or Standard; Transfer 
of Listing 
Item 3.02 Unregistered Sales of Equity Securities 
Item 3.02 Material Modification to Rights of Security Holders  
Section 4: Matters Related to Accountants and Financial Statements 
Item 4.01 Changes in Registrant’s Certifying Accountant  
 
Item 4.02 Non-Reliance on Previously Issued Financial Statements or a Related Audit Report or 
Completed Interim Review 
Section 5: Corporate Governance and Management  
Item 5.01 Changes in Control of Registrant 
Item 5.02 Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of 
Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers  
Item 5.03 Amendments to Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws; Change in Fiscal Year  
Item 5.04 Temporary Suspension of Trading Under Registrant’s Employee Benefit Plans  
Item 5.05 Amendment to Registrant’s Code of Ethics, or Waiver of a Provision of the Code of 
Ethics  
Item 5.06 Change in Shell Company Status  
Item 5.07 Submission of Matters to a Vote of Security Holders  
Item 5.08 Shareholder Director Nominations  
Section 6: Asset-Backed Securities 
Item 6.01 ABS Informational and Computational Material  
Item 6.02 Change of Servicer or Trustee  
Item 6.03 Change in Credit Enhancement or Other External Support  
Item 6.04 Failure to Make a Required Distribution  
Item 6.05 Securities Act Updating Disclosure  
Section 7: Regulation FD 
Item 7.01 Regulation FD Disclosure  
Section 8: Other Events 
Item 8.01 Other Events (The registrant can use this Item to report events that are not specifically 
called for by Form 8-K, that the registrant considers to be of importance to security 
holders.)  
Section 9: Financial Statements and Exhibits 




Figure 1 The reputation incentives variables, Office Depot in 2012 
The figure illustrates how %High Ranked and %Low Ranked are constructed using Office Depot in 2012 as an 
example. Each row represents all independent director positions held by each of the independent directors on the 
board of Office Depot. The area presents the relative market capitalization (in million US dollars) of each firm 
that each director serves. Office Depot’s board has six independent directors, three of which hold multiple 
appointments (Hedrick, Gaines and Mason). Hedrick serves both Office Depot and Hot Topic as an independent 
director. At $937m, the market capitalization of Office Depot is significantly greater than and Hot Topic’s $447m 
capitalization. Hedrick therefore ranks the Office Depot directorship high. In contrast, Gaines and Mason rank 
the Office Depot low as they each hold another directorship with a significantly larger firm. Out of Office 
Depot’s six independent directors, one director has high reputation incentives and two directors have low 
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